Abstract. Hadarics et. al. gave a Mathematical Model for Distributed Vulnerability Assessment. In this model the extent of vulnerability of a specific company IT infrastructure is measured by the probability of at least one successful malware attack when the users behaviour is also incorporated into the model. The different attacks are taken as independent random experiments and the probability is calculated accordingly. The model uses some input probabilities related to the characteristics of the different threats, protections and user behaviours which are estimated by the corresponding relative frequencies. In this paper this model is further detailed, improved and a numerical example is also presented.
Introduction
In recent decades information and infocommunication devices have become widely used. Besides their advantages previously unknown threats and malicious codes [8] , [9] appeared. Traditionally measuring cyber risk usually consist of testing malicious activity [3] and penetration testing [10] , [1] . Information can be obtained from the traffic of the network hence interactive metrics can be evolved [5] , [2] , [7] . The behaviour of the users is usually regarded as a factor of secondary importance which can result in a model not adequately representing real life situations.
In an adequate model for assessing vulnerability of a specific business all three factors should be considered:
1. Malicious activity from the outher world threatening the IT network of the business.
2. Not properly protected elements of the IT network at the business.
3. Dangerous behaviours of users inside the business.
The model
Most of the notation of [4] will be used. For completeness these notations are to be reviewed. Let L{l 1 , . . . , l τ } be the set of all available threat landscapes. In what follows a specific landscape will be used denoted by l. Let T all be the set of all possible malware. Let T = {t 1 , . . . , t k } be the set of all possible malware inside l. Let U = {u 1 , . . . , u r } be the set of all users. Let D = {d 1 , . . . , d m } be the set of all possible devices inside l. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be the set of all available protections inside l. Let UT = {ut 1 , . . . , ut i } be the set of all possible user tricks used by any malware inside l.
An integrated measure of vulnerability accounting for all three sources (attacker ingenuity, infrastructure weakness and adverse user behaviour) can be constructed.
For any given threat or class of threats for which the requisite IT infrastructure vulnerability and user facilitation is known, we can obtain a best estimate of:
1. The probability that an attacker will use a particular threat or class of threats against the enterprise (p prev ). The probability p prev is estimated by p prev (t, l) = number of computers infected by t inside l number of all computers inside l for t ∈ T . Note, that p prev can be based on a measurement or estimation and must be related to a time interval. Let
be a vector. This means if we examine a particular attack, then the probability that this attack is in the form of the threat t 1 is p prev (t 1 ), etc.
2. The probability that the enterprise's IT infrastructure will allow the attack to be carried out successfully (p device ). To elaborate the estimation of p device first some auxiliary probabilities are defined and estimated. The probability p prot (t, p) is introduced p prot (t, p) = number of successful attempts of t through the protection p number of all attempts of t through the protection p for any t ∈ T and p ∈ P. Let
be a k × n matrix. This means that the probability of a successful attempt of t 1 through the protection p 1 is p prot (t 1 , p 1 ), etc. The value z device−elements (d, t) is introduced
be an m × n matrix. Let
be a k × n matrix where
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, x ∈ {1, . . . , k} and y ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This means that if the threat t 1 can work on d j , then the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through the protection p 1 on the device
for any t ∈ T . Let
be the column vector where
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and x ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This means that if the threat t 1 can work on d j , then the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through any protection protecting the device d j is p device−prot−d j (t 1 ), etc. The probability p device−prot (d, t) is introduced
for any t ∈ T and d ∈ D. Let
be an m × k matrix where
for any x ∈ {1, . . . , m} and y ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The probability p device (d, t) is introduced
for any x ∈ {1, . . . , m} and y ∈ {1, . . . , k}. This means that the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through any protection protecting the device d 1 is p device (d 1 , t 1 ), etc.
3. The probability that users of the enterprise's IT infrastructure will provide sufficient facilitation for the attack to succeed (p user ). The p usertrick (t, ut) probability is introduced p usertrick (t, ut) = number of attempts of t where t used ut number of all attempts of t for any t ∈ T and ut ∈ UT . Let
be a k × i matrix. This means that the probability that the threat t 1 uses usertrick ut 1 is p usertrick (t 1 , ut 1 ), etc. The p user−usertrick (u, ut) probability is introduced p user−usertrick (u, ut) = number of successful attempts of ut on u number of all attempts of ut on u (or shortly p u−utrick (u, ut)) for any u ∈ U and ut ∈ UT . Let
be an r × i matrix. This means that the probability that the user u 1 uses usertrick ut 1 is p u−utrick (u 1 , ut 1 ), etc. From the probabilities p usertrick and p user−usertrick we can calculate the probability p user (u, t) which is the probability that the threat t infects using at least one usertrick through the user u. This is p user (u, t)
for any u ∈ U, t ∈ T and ut ∈ UT . Let P user = be an r × k matrix where p user (u 1 , t 1 )
etc. This means that the probability that the threat t 1 infects using at least one usertrick through the user u 1 is p user (u 1 , t 1 ), etc.
The probability of infection
These three probabilities (p prev , p device , p user ) can be combined to obtain an overall probability of malicious success, (provided each relevant combination of attack, user, and component of IT infrastructure is accounted for) [6] . The (p prev , p device , p user ) values are related to a given threat, a given user and a given device. The aggregated vulnerability would be an index of the whole organization related to all of the users, all of the devices and all of the possible threats. The probability of the infection is p s which is the probability that the investigated landscape will be infected by at least one malware. This can be calculated in the following form
for any u ∈ U, t ∈ T and d ∈ D.
The followings were assumed:
1. the attacker usage of the given threat, the IT infrastructure allowance and the user acceptance are different from each other, 2. all of the attack attempts are independent from each other, 3. the computer usage behaviours of all users are the same and equal to the average usage in the organization.
Observe the calculated p s value is related to the same time interval as the original p prev was related to.
A numerical example
Let T = {t 1 , . . . , t 4 } be the set of malware. Let U = {u 1 , . . . , u 7 } be the set of all users. Let D = {d 1 , d 2 , d 3 } be the set of all devices. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p 5 } be the set of all protections. Let UT = {ut 1 , . . . , ut 6 } be the set of all user tricks used by any malware in T . Let Observe
etc. This means that the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through the protection p 1 on the device 
etc. This means that if the threat t 1 can work on d 1 , then the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through any protection protecting the device d 1 is 0.02, etc. Furthermore 
etc. This means that the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 1 through any protection protecting the device d 1 is 0.02. Since t 2 can not work on d 1 , the probability of a successful attempts of the threat t 2 through any protection protecting the device d 1 is 0, etc. Let This means that the probability that the threat t 1 uses usertrick ut 1 is 0.141, etc. Observe the sum of the probabilities in any row is not greater than 1. Let P user usertrick = This means that the probability that the user u 1 uses usertrick ut 1 is 0.031, etc. Thus This means that the probability of the infection of the investigated company with users u 1 , . . . , u 7 , devices d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , protections p 1 , . . . , p 5 and matrices as above is 0.079774. Thus we get that the probability of an infection by at least one malware is 0.079774.
Simulations
In this section results of simulation studies are presented. Businesses with different sizes (different number of devices and users) are modelled and the p s probabilities are calculated when certain number of threats are present. The results are summarized in Table 1 and Table 2 .
The Micro (Small, Medium, Big, resp.) business is a company (or department) with 10 (50, 100, 1000, resp.) devices and 10 (50, 100, 1000, resp.) users. In real life the probabilities p prev , p prot , p usertrick and p user−usertrick can be estimated by relative frequencies but in the simulations these were estimated by random uniform probabilities. In the Table 1 Table 1 correspond to the case when the number of protections is 5 and the number of usertrick is 5.
The probability 0.25 in the cell of the third row of the second column in Table 1 means that the approximate probability of p s is 0.25 if there are 10 devices, 10 users in the company, the number of threats is 10, the number of protections is 5, the number of usertricks is 5, the random elements of the vector P prev lie on the interval [0.9, 1], the random elements of the matrix P prot lie on the interval [0, 0.1], the random elements of the matrix P usertrick lie on the interval [0, 0.1] and the random elements of the matrix P user−usertrick lie on the interval [0, 0.1]. Of course the matrices Z device−elements and Z device−prot−install are random matrices with elements 0 or 1. Observe that if the number of the devices (or users) or the number of the threats is large, then the probability is close to 1. The probabilities in Table 1 can be regarded as overestimates of the real p s probabilities since the sum of the elements in the random vector P prev is greater than 1.
In the Table 2 Table 2 correspond to the case when the number of protections is 5 and the number of usertrick is 5. The difference between the Table 1 and Table 2 is the input random data p prev .
Conclusions
From the simulation studies it can be seen that the model presented can be used for defining an index number reflecting the state of vulnerability of a certain company against cyber attacks. However these simulations also show that this model has constraints of applicability because if the size of the company is big enough, then the probability p s is very close to 1 and no distinction can be made between the vulnerability of different companies. To overcome these constrains of the applicability it can be used either only to a smaller part of a large network or to a randomly selected smaller sample of users and devices.
This index can be a good measuring tool of comparing the vulnerability of different parts of a company or comparing the state of vulnerability of a company at different time instances.
Comparing different user behaviours can give valuable pieces of information for the company managements about the needs of improving employees awareness against cyber attacks.
